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Of Badges, Bonds and Boundaries: 
Ingroup/outgroup differentiation and ethnocentrism revisited 
 





At the fifth Annual Meeting of the European Sociobiological Society (ESS), St. John’s College, 
Oxford, U.K. (January 5-6, 1985), I presented the following paper: 
 
“I present a literature review of theories and research concerning the phenomena of 
ethnocentrism, ingroup/outgroup differentiation, moralistic aggression, xenophobic 
aggression, collective intolerance, and intergroup violence, all of which are regarded as parts 
of one complex and composite syndrome. An attempt to interpret the ethnocentrism 
syndrome as a symbol-system-cum-sentiment-structure is offered, and its value as an 
explanatory category for the causation of ‘primitive’ warfare is assessed” (The paper was 
published as “Ethnocentrism and in-group/out-group differentiation” in: V. Reynolds, V. 
Falger & I. Vine (Eds.) The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary dimensions of 
xenophobia, discrimination, racism and nationalism, 1987, pp. 1-47). 
 
In this paper I intend to revisit this literature and research, and especially what has been added 
since that time (in particular the important Shaw & Wong (1989) Genetic Seeds of Warfare 
monography and Anne Katrin Flohr’s (1994) Fremdenfeindlichkeit: biosoziale Grundlagen von 
Ethnozentrismus. I shall also attempt to assess the value of sociobiological or evolutionary 





In order to appreciate what is so special about human group phenomena and ethnocentrism, I 
start by presenting some observations on human (collective) violence generally. 
 Violence in and between human societies, with the exception of some forms of domestic, 
criminal and pathological violence, is virtually always a collective activity or committed in the 
name of a collectivity. “Adults kill and torture each other only when organized into political 
parties, or economic classes, or religious denominations, or nation states. A moral distinction is 
always made between individuals killing for themselves and the same individual killing for 
some real or supposed group interest” (Durbin & Bowlby, 1938). 
 This moral double standard leads to the masquerading of the violence committed in the name 
of one’s own in-group as justified self-defense, or as a well-deserved punishment for 
transgressions of mores, laws, or ideological orthodoxy. The violence may range from sanctions 
against a dissenter or potential renegade within the group, to punitive expeditions, and even 
genocide, between groups. 
 Total identification with the group makes the individual perform altruistic acts to the point of 
self-sacrifice, and at the same time behave with ruthless cruelty towards the enemy or victim of 
the group. As Koestler (1967) observed: the self-assertive behavior of the group is based on the 
self-transcending behavior of its members. The egotism of the group feeds on the altruism of its 
members. 
 The ulterior justification and legitimation of collective violence invokes complex ideological, 
symbolic constructions, superordinate goals, spiritual values, high moral principles, and the 
most noble, virtuous, righteous, self-transcendent and altruistic motives. “The most pernicious 
phenomena of aggression, transcending self-preservation and self-destruction, are based upon a 
characteristic feature of man above the biological level, namely his capability of creating 
symbolic universes in thought, language and behavior” (von Bertalanffy, 1958). 
 It is the ‘good’ intentions of mankind, man’s ‘high’ moral principles, his ‘noble’ strivings 
that lead to Armageddon. Or, as Koestler (1967) eloquently stated: “The crimes of violence 
committed for selfish, personal motives are historically insignificant compared to those com-
mitted ad majorem gloriam Dei, out of a self-sacrificing devotion to flag, a leader, a religious 
faith, or a political conviction. Man has always been prepared not only to kill but also to die for 
good, bad, or completely futile causes”. 
 Collective violence is covered with a thick patina of self-justification, ratiomorphic nonsense 
and pathos. “Men will die like flies for theories and exterminate each other with every 
instrument of destruction for abstractions” (Durbin & Bowlby, 1938). The most extensive, 
quixotic and disgusting violence is justified with the invocation of a utopian ideology, a paradise 
myth, a superiority doctrine, an eschatological or millenarian ideal state, or other highly abstract 
political/ethical categories, metaphysical values, and quasi-metaphysical mental monstrosities: 
National Security, Raison d’Etat, Freedom, Democracy, God, Volk und Heimat, Blut und 
Boden, Peace, Progress, Empire, Historical Imperative, Sacred Order, Natural Necessity, Divine 
Will, and so on and so forth. The human being as the ‘most ferocious of beasts’ as William 
James called him, is only a beast in the name of some superhuman ideal, which serves as a 
‘sanction for evil’ (Sanford & Comstock, 1971); divine or diffuse permission for large-scale 
destructiveness. The purity and sacredness of our cause, and the divine sanction of our actions 
(‘with God on our side’) is guaranteed by the wickedness of the enemy, who is envisaged as the 
incorporation of evil, the devil incarnate. 
 Ubiquitously evident in all forms of collective intolerance, Willhoite (1977) observes, is an 
expressed desire by leaders and/or members to protect and promote the uniformity, conformity, 
‘purity’ of the group by denouncing or acting intolerantly toward individuals or groups 
perceived – simply because they are different – as threats to the well-being and integrity of the 
intolerant collectivity. As Berger & Luckman (1966) explained: “All social reality is precarious. 
All societies are constructions in the face of chaos. The constant possibility of anomic terror is 
actualized whenever the legitimations that obscure the precariousness are threatened or col-
lapse”. 
 Serious threats to a well-established, taken-for-granted symbolic universe may arise from 
deviants within the society (‘heretics’) or from external contact with another society possessing 
a radically different – but also taken-for-granted internally – symbolic universe. One possible – 
and historically common – response to such threats is ‘nihilation’, the conceptual liquidation of 
everything inconsistent with the official doctrine. That is, deviants or foreigners may be labeled 
as less than human, as ‘devils’ or ‘barbarians’ who dwell in impenetrable darkness. “Whether 
one then proceeds from nihilation to therapy, or rather goes on to liquidate physically what one 
has liquidated conceptually, is a practical question of policy”. 
 Berger & Luckmann’s description of this device for protecting a symbolic universe is acutely 
perceptive, but, as Willhoite (1977) points out, it does not explain why such differences should 
be perceived as threats that demand a nihilating response. This question is, at least in part, 
answered by Erikson’s (1964) concept of cultural pseudospeciation. 
 Man is the cultural animal par excellence. All members of the (sub)species Homo sapiens 
sapiens share the characteristic of being capable to create, and be created by, culture. At the 
same time, however, culture is the great unbalancer, the great catalyst of diversity and reinforcer 
of differences, underlying universal human cultural pseudospeciation. Owing to this process, 
human groups (be they ethnies, tribes or nations) tend to differ from one another to such a 
degree that the groups come to perceive each other as though they were totally different species. 
 Erikson’s concept of pseudospeciation denotes the fact that while Man is obviously one 
species, he appears on the scene split into groups (from tribes to nations, from castes to classes, 
from religions to ideologies) which provide their members with a firm sense of distinct and 
superior identity and the illusion of immortality. This demands, however, that each group must 
invent for itself a place and moment in the very center of the universe where and when an 
especially provident deity caused it to be created superior to all others, the mere mortals. Thus 
Man is “indoctrinated with the conviction that his ‘species’ alone was planned by an all-wise 
deity, created in a special cosmic event, and appointed by history to guard the only version of 
humanity... Man once possessed by this combination of lethal weaponry, moral hypocrisy, and 
identity panic is not only apt to lose all sense of species but also to turn on another subgroup 
with a ferocity generally alien to the ‘social’ animal world” (Willhoite, 1977). 
 Especially Tinbergen (1968, 1981) has pointed out how violence changes in character from 
intraspecific to interspecific/predatory the more the enemy is dehumanized and 
‘pseudospeciated’. No holds are barred in hunting down a foreign species. 
 MacCurdy (1918) foreshadowed this valuable concept of pseudospeciation in his Psychology 
of War. According to him, early tribal warfare had fixed the idea that strangers were another 
species, and thus was overcome the natural taboo [i.e., inhibition] against killing conspecifics. 
Humans by their herd nature were doomed to split into groups, and these groups behaved 
biologically like separate species struggling for existence. During times of war, he suggested, 
humans still felt vestigial emotions of hostility to their enemies as species other than themselves 
(Crook, 1994). 
 Definitely involved in human violence are highly complex and elaborate, abstract and rule-
governed, cognitive conceptual and symbolic processes, meanings and constructs of reality, 
attitudes, norms, values, codes of conduct, anticipations, strategies, etc. This, in turn, has its 
negative side; the ability of Man to create psychological ‘distancing devices’, to dehumanize, 
diabolize, to exterminate his enemies like vermin in fantasy and in reality; and to generate 
Weltanschauungen in which only a small portion of humanity fits, and social paradises from 
which the ‘misfits’ have to be expelled. 
 Together with the concept of cultural pseudospeciation, dehumanization (the perception or 
definition of other people as less than human or even nonhuman) is probably the most important 
proximate concept for understanding malignant (mass)violence phenomena, including ‘ethnic 
cleansing’, war atrocities, massacres and genocide, in humans (and probably as ‘dechimpization’ 
[Goodall, 1986] in chimpanzees as well). There is a profound paradox involved in the process of 
dehumanization in the sense that one can only dehumanize what is recognized and 
acknowledged to be human in the first place. 
Volkan (1992) identifies, besides dehumanization, two more elements in the group dynamics 
toward violence and war: the ‘Chosen Trauma’ and the ‘Chosen Glory’ of the group. Similarly, 
Galtung (1994) identifies Chosenness, Trauma and Myths of a Glorious Past, which together 
form a syndrome: the Chosenness-Myth-Trauma (CMT) complex or, more evocatively, the 
‘collective megalo-paranoia syndrome’. Chosenness means the idea of being a people chosen by 
transcendental forces (the gods), above all others, endowed, even anointed, to be a light unto 
others, with the right and even the duty to govern them. Trauma means the idea of being a 
people hit and hurt by others, possibly out of their envy, by enemies lurking anywhere, intent on 
hitting again. Chosenness induces collective sentiments of grandeur relative to all others. This is 
then built into the Myths of a Glorious Past to be recreated, the present being suspended 
between the glorious past and the glorious future. But the traumas can also be used to validate 
the idea of chosenness; “we have suffered so much, there must be a deeper meaning to that 
suffering”. New traumas are then expected for the future, with a mixture of fear and the lustful 
anticipation of self-fulfilling prophecies coming true. The three parts of the syndrome reinforce 
each other socially, not only as ideas, in a vicious circle. 
 The group incorporates the mental representation of the traumatic event(s) into its identity, 
thus leading to the intergenerational transmission of historical enmity. Once a trauma becomes a 
chosen trauma, the historical truth about it does not really matter. In war or war-like situations, 
the leader evokes the memory of the chosen trauma, as well as that of the chosen glory, to 
galvanize his people and make his group more cohesive. Historical enmity thus acts much like 
an amplifier in an electrical circuit (Volkan, 1991). 
 In this context it is appropriate to recall that hostility, enmity, and especially cruelty 
presuppose elaborate, highly evolved abstract symbolization as well as complex information 
processing, storage and recall facilities, or, in short: good long-term memory. 
 
[I]t is precisely what are widely thought to be the most unusually highly evolved biological 
characteristics of Homo sapiens, our cognitive and symbolic skills, which offer the readiest 
facilitation to violence and aggression. The same zest for analytical skill and strong commit-
ment to group norms, which is the essence of science, is at the root of the successful 
construction of the social and ideological boundaries which are the effective prerequisite to 





Hobbes and Ferguson 
In 1767 the Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson published an Essay on the History of Civil 
Society, probably the first attempt at an empirical investigation of the origins of war using 
ethnographic data. His analysis seemed to confirm Hobbes (1651): the primitive state was 
indeed a state of war (status hostilis): “We have had occasion to observe, that in every rude state 
the great business is war; and that in barbarous times, mankind, being generally divided into 
small parties, are engaged in almost perpetual hostilities” (Essay 3.5). 
Among the Hobbesian motives for war – competition, diffidence, and glory – Ferguson clearly 
assigns priority to glory. Both cannibals and kings fight for honor more than for booty or any 
other material interest: “Mankind not only find in their condition the sources of variance and 
dissension: they appear to have in their minds the seeds of animosity, and they embrace the 
occasions of mutual opposition, with alacrity and pleasure” The basic cause of war is rivalry. 
And Ferguson sees positive value in it, where Hobbes had seen only a necessary evil. Ferguson 
points out that warfare enforces civic unity, engenders civic virtue, promotes social 
organization, and in fact may be an essential condition for the very existence of civilization 
(Dawson, 1996). 
In addition to maintaining the balance-of-power between societies, Ferguson ascribes to warfare 
the function of maintaining solidarity and morale within societies. In-group amity depends upon 
out-group enmity and vice versa. This idea could also be found, in primordial form, in classical 
authors, especially the Roman historians (e.g., Sallust), but Ferguson probably offers the first 
analysis of the phenomenon of ethnocentrism in history. 
 
Ethnocentrism is considered to be a schismatic in-group/out-group differentiation, in which 
internal cohesion, relative peace, solidarity, loyalty and devotion to the in-group, and the 
glorification of the sociocentric-sacred (the own cosmology, ideology, social myth, or 
Weltanschauung; the own ‘godgiven’ social order) is correlated with a state of hostility or 
permanent quasi-war (status hostilis) toward out-groups, which are often perceived as inferior, 
subhuman, and/or the incorporation of evil. Ethnocentrism results in a dualistic, Manichaean 
morality which evaluates violence within the in-group as negative, and violence against the out-
group as positive, even desirable and heroic. 
 This is, admittedly, a rather extreme definition. The usual dictionary definition of 
ethnocentrism is “the tendency to regard one’s own group and culture as intrinsically superior to 
all others” (Webster’s Dictionary). Superiority of the own group and culture, however, 
(psycho)logically implies inferiority of other groups and cultures. And viewing other 
groups/cultures as inferior empirically appears to imply some degree (however small) of 
contempt, stereotyping, discrimination and dehumanization of, and at least a modicum of 
hostility toward, members of those other groups/cultures. Ethnocentrism and its canonical 
variants (tribalism, nationalism, patriotism, parochialism, jingoism, etc.) also appears to be 
intimately connected with xenophobia, a complex attitude system-cum-sentiment structure 
involving dislike, distrust, aversion, revulsion, fear and antagonism vis-à-vis 
strangers/foreigners/aliens and everything the stranger/foreigner/alien represents. 
 Two forms of the ethnocentric syndrome must probably be distinguished: (1) A belligerent, 
megalomaniac, superiority-delusional form (Chosen People complex), and (2) a relatively 
peaceful, self-conceited, isolationist form (e.g., the true Hellenes in relation to the ‘Barbaroi’; 
the Han Chinese vis-à-vis the peripheral ‘y_mán’ peoples). 
 Hardin (1972) introduced the related concept of tribalism: “Any group of people that 
perceives itself as a distinct group, and which is so perceived by the outside world, may be 
called a tribe. The group might be a race, as ordinarily defined, but it need not be; it can just as 
well be a religious sect, a political group, or an occupational group. The essential characteristic 
of a tribe is that it should follow a double standard of morality – one kind of behavior for in-
group relations, another for out-group”. 
 Other authors use terms like ‘group egoism’, ‘groupism’, etc. in a similar sense. 
 There are two prevailing views of the fundamental nature of ethnicity. One emphasizes the 
ascriptive, or primordial, nature of ethnic group membership and the importance of kinship, 
early socialization, and strong emotional ties. The other insists that ethnicity is situationally 
defined, that ethnic group boundaries are malleable and permeable, and that ethnicity may be 
acquired or divested at will (Richmond, 1987). This has been called the instrumentalist position. 
Van den Berghe (1981) has attempted to show that the primordialist-instrumentalist controversy 
is based on a simple-minded antinomy, and that the two views complement rather than 
contradict each other. 
 
 
Ethnocentrism: Brief History of the Concept 
 
‘Ethnocentrism’ is a major theme in both biological and cultural theories of the causes of 
primitive war. Furthermore, it is a relatively old one. Though the term ‘ethnocentrism’ was to be 
coined a few decades later, the concept was by no means unknown among 19th century 
anthropologists such as Tylor (1871): “The old state of things is well illustrated in the Latin 
word hostis, which, meaning originally stranger, passed quite naturally into the sense of enemy. 
Not only is slaying an enemy in open war looked on as righteous, but ancient law operates on 
the doctrine that slaying one’s own tribesman and slaying a foreigner are crimes of quite 
different order...”. He viewed ethnocentrism (as well as the obligations of the blood feud) as 
making sense within a framework of primitive concepts of law and justice. 
 Also Darwin (1871) had noticed that early humans and contemporary primitive peoples as a 
rule confined their sympathy to the own tribe and generally did not regard violence against other 
tribes as a crime. He clearly saw the correlation between intergroup competition and intragroup 
cooperation, which is the core of the ethnocentrism syndrome, in human evolution. So did his 
contemporaries such as Comte (1869), Spencer (1850 et seq.), Bagehot (1872) and Gumplowicz 
(1883). 
 In 1892-1893, after half a century of work, Spencer completed his vast system of philosophy 
with two volumes on The Principles of Ethics. In his studies of evolution he had hoped to find a 
code which placed human conduct on a scientific footing. Instead, he discovered that evolution, 
as seen to work in human communities, spoke with two voices, each enunciating a separate 
code. He called the one the ‘Code of Amity’, and the other the ‘Code of Enmity’: 
 
 Rude tribes and... civilized societies... have had continually to carry on an external self-
defence and internal co-operation – external antagonism and internal friendship. Hence their 
members have acquired two different sets of sentiments and ideas, adjusted to these two kinds of 
activity... A life of constant external enmity generates a code in which aggression, conquest and 
revenge, are inculcated, while peaceful occupations are reprobated. Conversely a life of settled 
internal amity generates a code inculcating the virtues conducing to a harmonious co-operation: 
justice, honesty, veracity, regard for each other’s claims (Spencer, 1892). 
 
Sumner (1906; 1911), who later coined the term ‘ethnocentrism’ for this dual code of conduct, 
heavily implicated ethnocentrism, and its collateral xenophobia, in the evolution of warfare. In 
his Folkways, Sumner (1906), echoing Spencer and Bagehot, writes: “The exigencies of war 
with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the in-group for 
war. The exigencies also make government and law in the in-group, in order to prevent quarrels 
and enforce discipline. Thus war and peace have reacted on each other, and developed each 
other, one within the group, the other in the inter-group relations. The closer the neighbors, the 
stronger they are, the intenser the warfare, and then the intenser is the internal organization and 
discipline of each”. 
Subsequently, Sumner (1911) elaborated his concept of ethnocentrism as follows: 
 
It is no paradox at all to say that peace makes war and that war makes peace. There are two 
codes of morals and two sets of mores, one for comrades inside and the other for strangers 
outside, and they arise from the same interests. Against outsiders it was meritorious to kill, 
plunder, practice blood revenge, and to steal women and slaves, but inside none of these 
things could be allowed because they would produce discord and weakness. Hence, in the 
ingroup, law (under the forms of custom and taboo) and institutions had to take the place of 
force. Every group was a peace group inside, and the peace was sanctioned by the ghosts of 
the ancestors who had handed down the customs and taboos. Against outsiders religion 
sanctioned and encouraged war, for the ghosts of the ancestors, or the gods, would rejoice to 
see their posterity and worshippers once more defeat, slay, plunder, and enslave the ancient 
enemy... 
The sentiment of cohesion, internal comradeship, and devotion to the ingroup, which carries 
with it a sense of superiority to any outgroup and readiness to defend the interest of the 
ingroup against the outgroup is technically known as ethnocentrism. It is really the sentiment 
of patriotism in all its philosophic fullness, that is, both in its rationality and in its 
extravagant exaggeration... Perhaps nine-tenths of all the names given by savage tribes to 
themselves mean ‘men’, ‘the only men’, or ‘men of men’; that is, ‘We are men, the rest are 
something else’... Religion has always intensified ethnocentrism; the adherents of a religion 
always think themselves the chosen people, or else they think that their god is superior to all 
others, which amounts to the same thing (Sumner, 1911). 
 
In his Folkways, Sumner (1906) had already emphasized this superiority-delusional aspect of 
ethnocentrism, which he regarded as universal, in describing it as “this view of things in which 
one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to 
it... Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own 
divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only 
right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn”. 
 Though Sumner’s thesis, as Shaw & Wong (1989) observed, imposed a rather reductionistic 
and mechanistic interpretation on the relationship between ethnocentrism and war proneness, it 
has been widely adopted (e.g., Murdock [1949]: “[I]ntergroup antagonism is the inevitable 
concomitant and counterpart of in-group solidarity”), supported by a substantial body of 
evidence (vide infra), and widely debated since its inception (e.g., Catton, 1961; LeVine & 
Campbell, 1972; Reynolds, Falger & Vine, 1987; A. Flohr, 1994). 
 The herd psychologists and instinctivists of the fin de siècle period also acquitted themselves 
well in the evolution and ethnocentrism debate (see  Crook, 1994). McDougall (1908), for 
example, developed Darwin’s theme that social solidarity and altruism arose from the need to 
organize for war. 
 The next author, after Sumner, to elaborate the theme of ethnocentrism in relation to primi-
tive warfare was Davie (1929), who sketched a truly Hobbesian picture of the ‘savage’ world, 
pointing out that the relation of primitive groups to one another is one of isolation, suspicion, 
hostility and war; a status hostilis, if not a regular status belli. Yet within the tribe the common 
interest against every other tribe compels its members to unite for self-preservation. “Thus a 
distinction arises between one’s own tribe – the ‘in-group’ – and other tribes – the ‘out-group’; 
and between the members of the first peace and cooperation are essential, whereas their inbred 
sentiment toward all outsiders is one of hatred and hostility. These two relations are correlative”. 
 Thus Davie did not add much to Sumner’s arguments in terms of theoretical sophistication. 
He did, however, summarize the then available ethnological evidence from all over the world. In 
the accounts of contemporary anthropologists, the theme or Leitmotif of ethnocentrism, whether 
implicit or explicit, is clearly recognizable (e.g., Rappaport, 1968; Koch, 1974; Huber, 1975; 
Chagnon, 1977; Herdt, 1981; Paula Brown, 1982; Knauft, 1983; among many others). 
 Such a state of affairs has resulted in the isolation of many primitive peoples, their ignorance 
of one another, and the great variation in their mores (Davie, 1929), and languages (Bigelow, 
1972). There are, for example, more than 700 mutually unintelligible languages in New Guinea 
today, and American Indians spoke several thousand different languages a few centuries ago. As 
Bigelow (1972) suggests: “When they cannot understand one another beyond the level of smiles 
and grunts and blatant gestures, people rarely achieve deep cultural bonds and common 
loyalties. It is therefore most unlikely that a sense of belonging and of mutual concern could 
have been extended through the whole of mankind during prehistoric times or that it could have 
persisted for several million years. The evolution of linguistic capacities, therefore, would have 
served to reinforce territorial and other segregating forces during prehistoric times. And greater 
linguistic abilities would have simultaneously increased the social cohesion within each separate 
group. Conceptual and emotional differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ would have been 
accentuated”. 
 Tiger & Fox (1971) similarly hypothesized that the evolution of linguistic capacities would 
have served to reinforce segregating forces during prehistoric times, while simultaneously 
increasing social cohesion within each separate group. 
 
 
Ethnocentrism and Nationalism 
 
Ethnocentrism is not a monopoly of primitive peoples. It is also a common theme, in the guise of 
nationalism, in the history of civilization. 
Nationalism and ethnocentrism are similar in the sense that usually they both involve positive 
attitudes toward an in-group and negative attitudes toward some or all out-groups. They do not 
overlap completely, however. Nationalism, more often than ethnocentrism, involves loyalty to a 
politically distinct entity, membership in an elaborately organized and relatively populous social 
grouping, adherence to a formalized ideology, and performance of relatively stereotyped 
allegiance-expressing behavior (e.g., Rosenblatt, 1964; A.D. Smith, 1981, 1994). 
 Bauer (1907) defined a nation as a community shaped by shared experiences. The nation is a 
Schicksalsgemeinschaft – a community united by a common fate (see also Loewenberg, 1985, 
1994). This is, psychologically, a much more sensible conception of the nation than the formal 
definitions of the political scientists. 
 The cognitive approach to nationalism, as exemplified by Hobsbawm (1990), regards it as a 
historical phenomenon concomitant with the rise and decline of the nation-state. Thus 
Hobsbawm (1972) argued that nationalism is a historical phenomenon, the product of the fairly 
recent past, and unlikely to persist indefinitely. Nationalism, he predicts, “will decline with the 
decline of the nation-state” (Hobsbawm, 1990). This approach would deny any primordial, 
individual human propensity to one form of ethnocentrism or another. The rational choice, 
marginal utility, and transactional theories of ethnic and nationalist identification do not, 
however, take into consideration the often irrational, passionate animosities, equally passionate 
loyalties, strong affective attachments to sacred symbols and myths, threat perceptions, and 
other emotional aspects involved. All too often in human affairs passion overrides reason, and 
ethnophobias turn into hatred, hostility, and violence (Loewenberg, 1994; Richmond, 1987). As 
Falger (1991, 1994) reasoned, the view of nationalism as a recent historical phenomenon is valid 
only for those who are insensitive to its underlying ultimate dimension. The association of 
nationalism with the nation-state is indeed relatively recent, but it is only one phenotypic 
expression of the deep in-group/out-group structure inherited from human prehistory. 
 In the view of LeVine & Campbell (1972), nationalism represents an advance over earlier 
forms of ethnocentrism in the sense that it obtains the more intense and broad responsiveness of 
a large population to the state leadership. 
 ‘Nationalism’, according to A.D. Smith (1994), signifies both an ideological doctrine and a 
wider symbolic universe and fund of sentiments. In the nation’s flags and anthems, its 
memorials and monuments, its parades and ceremonies are distilled the pride and hope of a 
‘community of history and destiny’ which seeks to shape events and mould itself in the image of 
its ideals. To this end, the modern nation of ‘fraternal citizens’ must always return to the 
idealizations of its past, to its myths of ethnic origin, descent and development, and above all, to 
the ‘golden ages’ that guide its path and endow it with a confidence to face the unknown, and to 
the heroes whose virtues inspire public emulation and exalted faith. For as Durkheim (quoted in 
A.D. Smith, 1994) reminded us: “There can be no society which does not feel the need of 
upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas 
which make its unity and its personality”. 
 In a recent perceptive contribution to the problem of (ethnic) nationalism, Ignatieff (1994) 
notes that nationalism is everywhere characterized by a deeply insincere and unauthentic 
rhetoric functioning as an excuse for excesses and atrocities. Everywhere historical truth is the 
‘first casualty’. 
 Wilson & Daly (1985) and Daly & Wilson (1987) noted the preponderance of young males in 
all kinds of criminal violence. They called it the “Young Male Syndrome”. Ignatieff noticed that 
most nationalist violence, too, is committed by a small minority of young males (some of whom 
may be psychopathic; most, however, are perfectly sane). Apparently not everyone abhors or 
fears violence. Presumably, it is deeply pleasurable and satisfactory for young armed males to 
have the power of life and death over other people; to fanatically assert themselves at the cost of 
others and to escape from insignificance; to rebel against and disrupt the deeply resented order 
of the state; to massively rape; to psychologically and morally and phylogenetically regress (see 
Bailey, 1987, for the theory of phylogenetic regression). 
 Wrangham & Peterson (1996) note that the underlying psychology is no different for urban 
gangs, pre-state warrior societies, and contemporary armies: “Demonic males gather in small, 
self-perpetuating, self-aggrandizing bands. They sight or invent an enemy ‘over there’ – across 
the ridge, on the other side of the boundary, on the other side of a linguistic or social or political 
or ethnic or racial divide. The nature of the divide hardly seems to matter. What matters is the 
opportunity to engage in the vast and compelling drama of belonging to the gang, identifying 
the enemy, going on the patrol, participating in the attack” (italics added). 
 The special blend of militant nationalism, pugnacious patriotism, and expansionist 
imperialism is called jingoism. In his The Psychology of Jingoism, Hobson (1901) attributed it to 
man’s ‘ancient savage nature’ lurking somewhere in ‘sub-conscious depths’, under the 
superstructure or thin veneer of civilization. He spoke of the “animal hate, vindictiveness, and 
bloodthirstiness” that lurked in the mildest-mannered patriot. Also Inge (1915) traced the 
‘perverted patriotism’ that according to him caused war to “the inborn pugnacity of the bête 
humaine”. These are by now familiar variants of Plato’s ‘Beast Within’. 
 Marshall (1898), also writing in the fin de siècle instinct psychology tradition, included 
among his ‘tribal instincts of a higher type’, the patriotic instinct, which was aroused by 
aggressive threats from neighboring nations, or by opportunity for tribal aggrandizement. He 
explained the self-sacrificial behavior of warriors in terms of biological sacrifice, a form of 
extreme altruism that paid off in ‘tribal advantage’ (Crook, 1994), anticipating kin selection 
theory by more than half a century. 
 Sir Arthur Keith (1916) discovered ‘somehow’ (as Shafer [1972] condescendingly put it) that 
the feeling of nationality arose out of the ‘tribal instinct’, fostered on ‘nature’s cradles’ among 
early men. Nature had, he divined, separated “mankind into herds and tribes and kept them 
isolated and pure for an endless period... by real and most effective barriers in the human heart”. 
 
 
The Adaptive Significance of Xenophobia 
 
There is an analogy, according to Rosenblatt (1964), between immunological reactions of the 
body and the ethnocentric reactions of the individual or of a society. 
 
 Just as the body is better prepared to avoid destruction by foreign substances as a result of a 
generalized tendency to resist the impingement of foreign substances, so an individual or a 
society may be better prepared to avoid destruction by aliens as a result of a generalized 
tendency to distrust, avoid, or reject apparently foreign individuals. The disadvantage of severe 
damage or destruction, whether likely to occur or not, is so much greater than whatever advan-
tages contact with things alien confers on one, that a psychological or biochemical paranoia is 
the preferred strategy for survival. Where one failure to anticipate the malevolence of an alien 
person or substance may be fatal, organisms that must acquire defensive reactions to each 
specific harmful person or substance are less likely to survive during a given period of time than 
organisms prepared to be defensive against all alien persons or substances (Rosenblatt, 1964) 
 
Also Barash & Lipton (1985) postulated an adaptive significance of (mildly) paranoid thinking. 
In situations of strong intergroup competition, they explain, the payoff for vigilance, 
suspiciousness, and aggression could be substantial. 
 Similarly, Shaw & Wong (1989) contend, mechanisms which prompted appropriate behavior 
on the first encounter with potentially dangerous predators/strangers would be favored through 
selection over alternate mechanisms where behavior required experience with strangers. Indeed, 
the costs of not suspecting strangers, and being wrong, would have been so high that natural 
selection would not likely have left defensive behaviors to an open-minded experimental 
strategy alone. H. Flohr (1987) makes a similar point with respect to nonhuman animals. 
Cognitive appraisals of threats would not have been limited to imminent danger but to any 
special circumstances that might have upset the status quo. As Fromm (1973) points out, objects 
of our fear and anxiety need not be causal antecedent conditions. Rather, they can be anticipated 
events which might or might not happen. 
 “A genetically coded aversion toward strangers would have enabled individuals to avoid 
attack more readily or immediately than would learning alone, and by avoiding injury and death, 
survival would be enhanced, leaving more offspring from these individuals. Over time, those 
with the genetically coded aversion toward strangers would come to prevail in the population” 
(Shaw & Wong, 1989). 
 Indeed, as Lumsden & Wilson observe: “Better to have a generalized fear of the dark and to 
shrink thrilled and apprehensive from the unknown than to take time to learn and deal with each 
menace in turn”. 
 MacDonald (1992) has probably explained the rationale underlying the paranoid stance most 
clearly. From an evolutionary perspective, he says, it would appear to be adaptive to exaggerate 
negative stereotypes about a genetically segregated group, or accept negative information based 
on minimal evidence, or to develop a generalized negative belief about an out-group which is 
based on the behavior of only a small minority of the out-group. Such a perspective can be seen 
to conform to a simple cost/benefit analysis: members of Group A benefit by erring on the side 
of preventing the error of rejecting a negative proposition regarding members of group non-A, 
when it could be true. In the language of statistics, people are proposed to behave as if 
attempting to minimize the probability of a Type II error: if the hypothesis is “Members of 
Group A are disloyal”, people appear to be greatly concerned about making the error of rejecting 
this proposition when in fact it could be true. They place less emphasis on making a Type I 
error, which is the probability of accepting the proposition “Members of Group A are disloyal” 
when in fact they are loyal. The cost/benefit reasoning is that making a Type II error could be 
extremely costly, while making a Type I error costs little or nothing. 
The general principle here is that if one knows that at least some members of a group are 
deceivers, but does not know exactly which ones, the best policy it to assume that all are 
deceivers if this policy has no negative consequences. 
 Such a strategy also makes good evolutionary sense for the explanation of the overperception 
of threat. An organism contemplating sine ira et studio every new situation arising in its 
immediate environment probably would not survive its first encounter with a predator. To be 
overcautious, overperceptive of threat or oversensitive to even minor signs of danger carries 
with it high costs in terms of vigilance (time/energy budget), sheltering, hiding, fleeing, etc., but 
these costs are insignificant compared to the costs of making the error of being not cautious 
enough. Such an error is fatal and final. An evolutionary strategy of being overcautious – 
jumping to conclusions given the slightest indication of danger – thus pays off in terms of 
survival and reproductive success, and may therefore be expected to be selected for. 
 According to Koestler (1967) the built-in schizophysiology of the human triune brain (e.g., 
MacLean, 1990) provides a physiological basis for “the paranoid streak running through human 
history”. 
 
 Xenophobia is a widespread trait throughout the animal kingdom, according to Southwick et 
al. (1974), but it is by no means universal. Among vertebrates, xenophobic aggression has been 
demonstrated experimentally in a great number of species, especially those with prominent 
territorial and/or relatively closed social groups, which are organized on a hierarchical basis 
(e.g., Holloway, 1974; Southwick et al., 1974; E.O. Wilson, 1971, 1975; see Van der Dennen 
[1987] for a review). The introduction of unfamiliar conspecifics to such groups (e.g., rodents, 
many primate species) may release massive attacks and even killing from the resident animals. 
 When it occurs in natural settings, xenophobia may be considered to be a functional and 
adaptive trait in that it maintains the integrity of the social group. It ensures that group members 
will be socially familiar. It limits the flow of individuals between groups, and can therefore 
affect patterns of both social and genetic evolution. Xenophobia has apparently evolved in those 
species where discrete, bounded social groups are adaptively favored (Southwick et al., 1974). 
 Also Hebb & Thompson (1968) cite the evidence in favor of the mammal’s xenophobia; the 
fear of and hostility towards strangers, even when no injury has ever been received from a 
stranger. The enmity aroused by conspecifics which are different (in anatomy, in coloration, in 
behavior, in language use) or by strangers, may easily lead toward discrimination, ostracism and 
cruelty in animals as well as man. 
 Markl (1976) deduced the following general rule from observations such as these: species 
with highly cooperative social behavior within the group are particularly apt to be very 
aggressive towards conspecifics that are not members of their group. 
 Several authors have suggested that mistrust and fear of the foreigner or the stranger may 
have biological origins. McGuire (1969) discussed the possible genetic transmission of 
xenophobia: “[I]t appears possible for specific attitudes of hostility to be transmitted genetically 
in such a way that hostility is directed toward strangers of one’s own species to a greater extent 
than toward familiars of one’s own species or toward members of other species. It would not be 
impossible for xenophobia to be a partially innate attitude in the human”. Vine (1987) argued for 
a genetically primed, generalized, weakly xenophobic and suspicious tendency as a defense 
against being deceived. Holloway (1974) would submit that at least for adult humans, 
xenophobic responses are normative unless there has been strong cultural training and 
conditioning against it. Clannishness, or strong intragroup affiliation coupled with distantiation 
of other ethnic, religious, racial, or political groups, is an enforcing mechanism for continued 
xenophobias. The demagogue, he observes, knows this fact only too well. 
 Trivers (1971) speculated that ‘moralistic aggression’ – an urge to attack someone who is 
acting unjustly or unfairly – evolved in humans as indispensable protection against excessive 
failure to reciprocate altruistic acts. ‘Moralistic aggression’ seems to be readily mobilized 
against individuals believed to be deviating from basic group norms and symbolic allegiances; 
that is, it can help enforce collective intolerance. 
 On the other hand, Hebb & Thompson (1968) argued that fear or dislike of the stranger is not 
innate, since it depends on certain prior experiences, yet it still does not have to be taught. “If, 
therefore, man is not born with a dislike for those who differ from him in habits or appearance, 
he can still pick up the dislike with no help or encouragement” (Hebb & Thompson, 1968). 
 Also Hamilton (1975) and Alexander (1979) argue that social interactions of an individual 
with his close relatives can provide all of the experiential background necessary to produce 
xenophobia. We tend to react negatively to countenances which are uncommunicative, and 
which convey contradictory or paradoxical messages. 
 It is not clear whether the transient phenomenon of the fear of strangers in infants – which 
predictably develops between 6 and 9 months of age – has any impact on adult xenophobia (See 
e.g., A. Flohr, 1994). This infantile fear of strangers is also reported in other social species (e.g., 
canids), and its development does not depend upon aversive experience with strangers. 
Furthermore, it also develops in congenitally deaf and blind children (e.g., Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 
1982). 
 Although the expression of these predispositions varies, Emmert (1984) and Shaw & Wong 
(1989) conclude, it seems that initial distrust of social strangers is universal among humans and 
nonhuman primates. Also R.Flohr (1987) concludes that xenophobia seems to be universal, i.e., 
it seems to occur in all cultures. This is no proof, he states, but strong evidence in favor of a 
biological basis of xenophobia (cf. Markl, 1982; A. Flohr, 1994). The biological basis concerns, 
of course, the tendency towards xenophobic prejudices, not their specific content. 
 Peck (1990) has shown through formal models that mechanisms of outsider exclusion can be 
favored by evolution. 
 
The Function of Enemies and the Need to Have Enemies 
Studies of conflict in settings ranging from small-scale primitive societies to international 
disputes suggest a fundamental need to have enemies. Having an enemy provides many 
pragmatic advantages. It provides a clear Manichaean structuring of the world; it simplifies the 
social cosmology. It provides an affirmation of one’s own moral superiority, and, by 
implication, the moral inferiority – even to the point of dehumanization and/or diabolization – of 
the enemy. 
 Enemy image thinking has its own (psycho)logic: if we are good, the enemy must be evil; if 
we are moral creatures, the enemy must be immoral; if we are virtuous, the enemy must be 
lascivious and vile; if we are human, the enemy must be less than human. 
 Moreover, it provides the opportunities for gratification of the satisfactions inherent in all 
kinds of ego-defense mechanisms, especially those of projection and scapegoating. “And there is 
the red-blooded satisfaction of being able to hate and to prepare to kill and destroy without 
feeling qualms of conscience” (Gladstone, 1959; see also Hartmann, 1982). 
 In the case of the ‘lunatic fringe’ members of such ‘hate-monger’ groups as e.g., the Ku Klux 
Klan, a grandiose pseudo-personality is provided for those who would otherwise be insignificant 
social ‘non-entities’ or peripheral psychotics. 
 Apart from increasing an individual’s sense of identity with a larger social entity, engaging in 
a conflict can also result in the release of a considerable amount of personal tension, fear and 
frustration in a ‘legitimate’ manner. 
 Enemy images are not easily susceptible to change, among other things because they lead to 
the institutionalization of selective perception. Only whatever confirms the threat and the evil 




Theories of Ethnocentrism 
 
Several theories have been proposed to explain the phenomenon of ethnocentrism. LeVine & 
Campbell (1972), whose work on the subject is a classic, listed the following: Realistic group 
conflict theory; evolutionary theories; reference group theory; sociopsychological theories 
(including a.o. group narcissism theory, projection theory, protest masculinity theory, and 
frustration-aggression-displacement theory which has been discussed more fully in Ch. 5); 
cognitive congruity theories; transfer theory; and reinforcement theory. The most relevant of 
these theories will be briefly discussed. 
 
Realistic Group Conflict Theory 
This theory assumes that group conflicts are rational in the sense that groups do have 
incompatible goals and are in competition for scarce resources. Such ‘realistic’ sources of group 
conflict are contrasted with the psychological theories that consider intergroup conflicts as 
displacements or projective expressions of problems that are essentially intragroup or intraindi-
vidual in origin. 
 “Real threat causes in-group solidarity” is the most recurrent explicit proposition of the 
theory. A parallel mechanism is the rejection of deviants and vengeance against renegades, 
apostates, revisionists, and heretics as a solidarity-promoting mechanism. Leaders may also seek 
out an enemy or create a fictitious one just to preserve or achieve in-group solidarity. This is 
certainly one of the most ubiquitous observations in the literature. 
 
Group Narcissism 
In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Freud regarded ethnocentrism as a 
form of narcissism at the group level. Later, in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), he stated 
explicitly that the social function of group narcissism lay in its facilitation of the displacement of 
aggression from in-group to out-group. 
 Ethnocentrism may also be interpreted as redirected expression of individual narcissism, 
providing individual group members with narcissistic gratification (e.g., Fromm, 1964). A 
further narcissistic aspect of tribalism and nationalism is that the idealized people or nation 
supplies grandeur to those who feel personally inadequate and flawed: “The last refuge of a 
scoundrel” as Samuel Johnson aptly remarked. 
 The various human pseudospecies also exploit what Freud called the “narcissism of minor 
differences” to exaggerate their own distinctiveness and, by implication, their superiority. All 
too often the behavior of national governments or group leaders provides ammunition to those 
who revel in these differences, especially when they permit the luxury of dehumanization. 
 
Projection 
Perhaps no concept has been more consistently applied to group stereotypes by psychoanalytic 
observers than that of projection, that is, the attribution to others of unacceptable impulses 
within one’s self. Taken in its most extreme form this approach argues that stereotypes of out-
groups are simply fantasies wholly derived from the unconscious needs of in-group members 
with no correspondence to the objective attributes of out-groups. 
 Pseudospeciation may be understood – at least in part – as an expression of one group’s 
projection of its demonology and displacement of its self-generated aggression onto another. 
Undesirable characteristics will turn up attributed to an out-group (projection) which will then 
serve as a rationalization for violence against the out-group (aggression displacement) (Erikson, 
1964). 
 Loewenberg (1994) expressed the ambivalence within us and the projection of the bad 
internal objects thus: “The good is what is me and mine – my family, village, clan, and people. 
The bad is outside – the others, them, the aliens, foreigners, the strangers. The strangers are 
uncanny because they contain parts of the self which are unacceptable, asocial, dirty, foul, 
lascivious, murderous and cruel. Therefore these parts are projected onto outsiders and 
strangers”. 
 
Compensatory or Protest Masculinity 
Bacon, Child & Barry (1963) present the basic position succinctly, in their discussion of the sex 
role identification of males as especially pertinent to the development of violent behavior. “It is 
assumed that the very young boy tends to identify with his mother rather than his father because 
of his almost exclusive contact with his mother. Later in his development he becomes aware of 
expectations that he behave in a masculine way and as a result his behavior tends to be marked 
by a compulsive masculinity which is really a defense against feminine identification”. 
 The authors identify a particular pattern of child training factors which tends to produce in 
the child persistent attitudes of rivalry, distrust and hostility which would probably continue into 
adult life (cf. Whiting, 1965). 
 The protest masculinity hypothesis may have even broader application to the phenomena of 
intergroup conflict. LeVine & Campbell (1972) speculate “that it is protest masculinity, with its 
heightened group narcissism, its hypersensitive, proud, prestige-conscious belligerence, that lies 
behind the ethnocentrism syndrome in its most extreme and irrational forms, not only in fighting 




Social Identity Theory and Group Animosity 
 
Social identity theory – which was largely developed after the appearance of LeVine & 
Campbell’s classic opus – proposes that individuals engage in a process in which they place 
themselves and others in social categories. There are several important consequences of this 
social categorization process: 
(1) Similarities between self and in-group members, and dissimilarities with out-group members 
are exaggerated (the accentuation effect).  
(2) The stereotypic behavior and attitudes of the in-group are positively valued, while out-group 
behavior and attitudes are negatively valued. Individuals develop favorable attitudes toward in-
group members and unfavorable attitudes toward out-group members. The in-group develops a 
positive distinctness, a positive social identity and increased self-esteem as a result of this 
process. Within the group there is a great deal of cohesiveness, positive affective regard, and 
camaraderie, while relationships outside the group may be hostile and distrustful (MacDonald, 
1992, 1996). 
 Tajfel (1970 et seq.), and many other social psychologists, provided experimental support for 
the hypothesis that an individual will discriminate against a member of an out-group even when 
(a) there is no conflict of interest; (b) there is no past history of intergroup hostility; and (c) the 
individual does not benefit personally from this behavior. Mere (random) categorization is 
sufficient to produce intergroup discrimination and prejudice (cf. also Rabbie, 1982, 1992; R. 
Brown, 1985; Hogg & Abrams, 1987, 1993; Tönnesmann, 1987; Vine, 1987; Abrams & Hogg, 
1993; Triandis, 1990; MacDonald, 1992, 1996; among many others). 
 Furthermore, people very easily adopt negative stereotypes about out-groups and these 
stereotypes possess a great deal of inertia (i.e., they are slow to change and are resistant to 
countervailing examples). Stereotypes are learned at a very early age, even before a child has 
much awareness or explicit knowledge of the other group. Finally, the stereotypes tend to 
become more negative and hostile in situations where there is actual intergroup competition and 
tension. 
 Social identity theorists propose that it is the need for high self-esteem which drives the 
entire process (MacDonald, 1992, 1996). Also Horowitz (1985) posits the quest for the 
affirmation of ‘personal worth’ as a central motive of human behavior: “self-esteem is in large 
measure a function of the esteem accorded to groups of which one is a member”. Hence, “the 
sources of ethnic conflict reside, above all, in the struggle for relative group worth”. The contest 
for group legitimacy, for political inclusion and exclusion, merges with the quest for group 
worth to form “a politics of ethnic entitlement”. For Horowitz, this is the engine of mass ethnic 
conflict. He also understands ethnicity to be a form of “greatly extended kinship”. The particular 
fierceness, bitterness and cruelty of ethnic conflicts can be understood, at least in part, through 
the relatedness of familial and ethnic consciousness: “If group members are potential kinsmen, a 
threat to any member of the group may be seen in somewhat the same light as a threat to the 
family” (Horowitz, 1985). 
 
(3) The result of these categorization processes is group behavior which involves discrimination 
against the out-group; beliefs in the superiority of the in-group and inferiority of the out-group; 
and positive affective preference for the in-group and negative affect directed toward the out-
group. 
The stereotyping process can also result in scapegoating (i.e., the explanation of complex events 
as resulting from the behavior of the out-group), and dehumanization. External threat (real or 
perceived) tends to reduce internal divisions and maximize perceptions of common interest 
among group members. 
 Anthropological evidence indicates the universality of the tendency to view one’s own group 
as superior (e.g., Davie, 1929; Vine, 1987; Shaw & Wong, 1989; MacDonald, 1996), and the 
empirical results of social identity research are highly compatible with an evolutionary basis for 
ethnocentric group behavior. A. Flohr (1994) similarly concludes her extensive review that there 
is a biological disposition toward ethnocentrism. Lopreato (1984), Irwin (1987, 1990), Shaw & 
Wong (1989), and Wuketits (1993) provide some compelling arguments why humans are 
genetically predisposed to ethnocentrism: in the EEA ethnocentrism and xenophobia enhanced 
individual reproductive success and survival. It can thus be considered to be a (bio)rational 
disposition. 
 In addition to the suggestion of universality, an evolutionary interpretation of these findings 
is supported by results indicating that these social identity processes also occur among 
‘advanced’ animal species such as chimpanzees (e.g., Goodall, 1986). 
 Moreover, as MacDonald (1992, 1996) points out, the powerful affective component of 
social identity processes is very difficult to explain except as an aspect of the evolved machinery 
of the human mind. As Hogg & Abrams (1987) note, this result cannot be explained in terms of 
purely cognitive processes, and a learning theory seems hopelessly ad hoc and gratuitous. The 
tendency for humans to place themselves in social categories and for these categories to assume 
immense affective, evaluative overtones is the best candidate for the biological underpinning of 
ethnocentrism (MacDonald, 1992, 1996; Shaw & Wong, 1989). 
 Within the framework of social identity theory, there is clearly no requirement that the 
beliefs regarding the in-group or the out-group be true. Bigelow (1969) notes that “each group 
requires something intimate, unique to itself, around which its members can cohere. Irrational 
beliefs serve this purpose far better than rational ones; they are not only easier to produce, but 
also less likely to be confused with enemy beliefs. Irrational fantasies produce a continuous 
supply of ‘group uniforms’, promoting and maintaining internal cohesion within each group, and 
segregation between groups”. 
 Also Tiger (1969) suggested that “males bond in terms of either a pre-existent object of 
aggression or a concocted one”. 
 
 
Dynamics of In-group/Out-group Differentiation 
 
Many authors have suggested that the separation of ethnic, racial, or social groups fosters 
hostility by blocking off communication. Without interaction between people or groups, it is 
easy for autistic spirals of hostility to develop. Especially, Newcomb (1947) pointed out the 
vicious circle by which an individual or a group once ready for hostile responses gradually 
reduces the channels of communication with the potential enemy, thus preventing rectification 
of the early impression of hostility and redress by friendly actions. Hostile isolation or autistic 
hostility is likely to make hostile tension more enduring (which does not necessarily mean that 
contact reduces hostility and prejudice between individuals and groups). 
 The dynamics involved in the experimental studies of in-group/out-group differentiation can 
be summarized as follows: within the groups the members close ranks; there is an increase in 
group cohesiveness and solidarity; the one group is considered to be superior to the other group; 
each group becomes more hierarchically organized; there is a greater willingness to accept 
centralized leadership; deviating opinions are barely tolerated; the group demands more loyalty 
and conformity from its members. Between the groups negative stereotypes tend to develop; 
communication between the groups decreases preventing the correction of negative stereotypes; 
during intergroup negotiations, members pay more attention to points of disagreement than they 
do to agreement; distrust and hostility towards the other group rises, sometimes erupting into 
open aggression; tactics and strategy for winning are emphasized at the expense of concern 
about the merits of the problem to be negotiated; and leaders increasingly become victims of 
‘groupthink’, i.e., deteriorating reality testing and rationality (Rabbie, 1982, 1992; Janis, 1971, 
1972). 
 Realistic conflict does not always involve an opposition of material and objective interests, 
as is sometimes suggested. Sherif & Sherif (1966), for example, make it clear that groups may 
compete about both material and nonmaterial interests; “the issues at stake may relate to values 
and goals shared by group members, a real or imagined threat to the safety of the group, an 
economic interest, a political advantage, a military consideration, prestige, or a number of 
others”. Mutually incompatible goals between groups are themselves considered to be sufficient 
condition for the rise of hostile attitudes and deeds toward another group. 
 Simmel (1904, 1955) and Coser (1956) proposed that conflict serves to establish and 
maintain the identity and boundary lines of societies and groups. According to the ‘safety-valve 
theory’ of conflict, conflict also serves as an outlet for the release of hostilities which, without it, 
would sunder the relation between the antagonists. 
 Sherif and his coworkers (Sherif, 1956 et seq.; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; 1966; Sherif et al., 
1961) have been particularly interested in the experimental production and reduction of friction, 
conflict and negative stereotypes between groups. All the field experiments verify the 
hypothesis that conflict between two groups tends to produce an increase in solidarity within the 
groups. In the first experiment, the introduction of a common enemy (another competing group) 
was successful in reducing conflict between the original two groups. This set of studies 
substantiate the point that the external threat that increased internal cohesion must involve an 
achievable superordinate goal (Stein, 1976). 
 One of the few attempts to replicate the Sherif experiments was that of Diab (1970). This 
experiment had some frightening consequences for the subjects as well as for the researcher who 
had to be hospitalized for exhaustion after the experiment was abruptly terminated. He had been 
too successful in arousing intergroup hostility. The conflict got completely out of hand; some 
boys knifed each other and the police had to evacuate the camp to prevent further violence 
(Rabbie, 1982). 
 Some of the intricate dynamics of the process of in-group/out-group antagonism, escalating 
into downright ‘warfare’, may be grasped from the accounts of McNeil (1961, 1962), living with 
a group of 70 “aggressive, anti-social, anti-adult boys” in a therapeutic summer camp. At once, 
the boys began a pattern of militant probing of one another in their individual and group 
relations seeking to establish a basis for dominance and submission. The camp’s aggressive 
pecking order was established through a number of interpersonal devices which resemble those 
used by primitive communities as well as civilized states to establish their position in the world: 
saber rattling, recounting past glories, the role call of allies, and deterrence by attack. 
 See Van der Dennen (1987) and Flohr (1987) for a review of scapegoating, ostracism, 
rejection of deviants and dissenters, discrimination, conspecific mobbing, and moralistic 
aggression in the context of within-group dynamics, as well as the role of anonymity, 
deindividuation, obedience, compliance, conformity, dehumanization and suspension of 
personal responsibility on the facilitation of atrocities and other extreme violence when people 
act as part of a group. 
 
 
The Logic of Ethnocentrism: The Duality of the Human Mind 
 
The particular logic of ethnocentrism, its Manichaean duality which dichotomizes the world into 
A and non-A, self and other, in-group and out-group, us and them, friend and foe, seems to 
spring from the cognitive capacity of Man to juxtapose, classify, categorize, distinguish, 
differentiate, dichotomize and discriminate, but also his ability to abstract, generalize and detect 
common determinators in things highly diverse. 
In this section I shall examine the cognitive aspects of the ethnocentrism syndrome, i.e., 
information processing and its distortions and biases, the mental representation of the social 
world, and the evolutionary algorithms underlying decision processes based on these cognitive 
maps. 
 The human tendency to think in binary categories or oppositions has often been noted, ever 
since Boole in his Laws of Thought (1854) made a strong case for its inevitability. It is part of 
our phylogenetic substrate of basic problem-solving strategies and cognitive heuristics. 
 The world view of many peoples seems to be made up of a number of binary opposites or 
antinomies (self/other; order/chaos; safety/danger; friend/foe; peace/war; clean/dirty; 
human/nonhuman; good/bad; familiar/alien, etcetera), which, furthermore, tend to cluster 
together at the positive and negative poles, such that the self (and, by extension, the in-group) is 
good, clean, and associated with order and safety; while the other (and, by extension, the out-
group) is alien and strange, and associated with chaos, danger, dirt, and potential violence. 
 Meyer (1987) pointed to the phenomenon that members of primitive groups frequently take 
their traditional enemy group as a kind of negative identity reference. 
 The human being has a powerful urge to dichotomize, E.O. Wilson (1978) states, and “We 
seem able to be fully comfortable only when the remainder of humanity can be labelled as 
members versus nonmembers, kin versus nonkin, friend versus foe”. 
 Possibly ethnocentrism operates as a primordial psychological mechanism which brings 
about a distinction of ‘us’ and ‘them’, in-group and out-group, and it may be hypothesized that 
‘advanced’ species like chimpanzees and humans have extra-strong needs for group boundaries, 
demarcations or delimitations, the strength of which must somehow be related to the species’ 
affective systems. 
 Our way of thinking has evolved as a response to the practical problems of living and 
reproducing in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness, and not to solve academic 
puzzles. We tend to think more in terms of categories or classes than in terms of individuals. 
Using these generalizations we form schemata. These schemata are extremely useful, but at the 
same time they enable us to form stereotypes. With regard to this regrettable side-product one 
could say with Anderson (1980): “Stereotyping reflects the dark side of schema abstraction”. 
This tendency culminates in a tendency to dichotomize phenomena. This involves the 
classification of objects within the nervous system – often beginning with our sensory percep-
tion – according to some kind of either-or rule (Flohr, 1987). 
 All organisms have to rely to a considerable degree on extrapolations based on their 
experiences, i.e., they have to make inferential judgments, so to speak, whenever they cannot 
rely on genetically controlled behavioral instructions. Based on inferential judgments (pre-
judgments) an organism will develop behaviors which could turn out to be wrong, but which 
could, by and large, overcompensate for this disadvantage by an increase in security and in 
rapidity. As long as they are more likely than a random search to lead to correct judgments, 
thereby protecting the conditions of survival, they are functional (Flohr, 1987). 
 Riedl (1980, 1985) has pointed to the enormous role that pre-judgments play in the behavior 
of all living systems. As he puts it: “The algorithm of living systems is not founded on the 
apparent contradictions of our inductive logic, but on probability”. In order to perceive and to 
evaluate, we have innate pre-judgments at our disposal, a whole system of phylogenetically 
acquired orientations that has been called ‘ratiomorphic apparatus’. 
 By sorting information from past experiences or environments through the use of behavioral 
predilections, such as rules of thumb or habit, adaptive rationality permits the efficient manage-
ment of considerable information. More than this, pre-judgments and rules of thumb reduce 
uncertainty by prescribing paths of action that have worked, in the past, to yield positive net 
returns (Shaw & Wong, 1989). 
 Humans have evolved mechanisms to cope with the problem of reduction of uncertainty. If 
information that reduces uncertainty is insufficient or not available, humans will simply create it 
or otherwise employ strategies to at least have the illusion of control of the situation (Kalma, 
1986, 1989). 
 The psychology of perception and attribution shows that our emotions and cognitions have a 
considerable impact on the selection, retention, and distortion of information. It has also been 
demonstrated that the processing of the perceived information is not some kind of objective, 
‘interest-free’ registration. It is influenced instead at each important junction by emotional and 
cognitive commitments or ‘wishful thinking’ (Flohr, 1987). 
 The frequent overestimation of environmental conditions (‘force of circumstances’) when 
accounting for our own behavior, and the overestimation of stable personality characteristics (or 
persistently evil intentions) in observations of other people’s behavior is one such perceptual 
and attributional distortion. 
 Reification (‘ideas-become-real’), also called ‘hypostatization’, refers to the human capacity 
to treat an abstraction as a real thing, substance or entity. It may even be anthropomorphized, 
taking on human or quasi-human form. Reification is critical to human action. It imposes 
familiarity and order on an otherwise chaotic environment (Peterson, 1981; Lumsden & Wilson, 
1981, 1983). 
 Examples are the anthropomorphized and personalized representations of the mother- or 
fatherland in nationalistic hymns, patriotic battle songs, and national anthems from all over the 
world. Such images are almost always employed as powerful mobilization devices in warfare. 
 The leader as the reification of the group is perhaps the most powerful form of 
symbolization. As Ike (1987) observes: “An individual person cannot identify himself with a 
large number of people; he needs a small group, a reference group, a peer group. Or he wants a 
symbol, a leader as stand-in for the larger mass of individuals with whom he cannot identify. 
The leader is the symbol, and the larger and stronger the number of individuals he represents, 
the better qualities are attributed to, or ‘projected’ on him”. 
 History abounds in charismatic leaders who symbolized the group and more or less success-
fully mobilized their followers. Many adopted a patriarchical role, representing themselves as 
symbolic fathers and their followers as symbolic children. Followers, in turn, were, and still are, 
are typically consumed by familylike devotion and, not infrequently, by fanatic loyalty (Shaw & 
Wong, 1989). 
 Humans have a deep-rooted propensity to respond emotionally to symbolic representations of 
their in-group. These emotional qualities may include spontaneous joy, a sense of pride, and the 
security of belonging. The in-group becomes emotionally integrated into the individual’s self-
system or identity (Isaacs, 1975; Tönnesman, 1987). In the expanded group context, emotions 
are typically aroused and reinforced through the language of kinship and the use of rituals, flags, 
anthems, drums, marches, and various kin-related heuristics (sacrifice for the Motherland) that 
have proven highly effective in promoting group solidarity (e.g., G.R. Johnson, 1986). 
 This strong emotional aspect is a rather neglected part of the dangers human groups 
constitute for each other, Elias (1987) observed. Human groups seem to take a strange delight in 
asserting their superiority over others, particularly if it has been attained by violent means. The 
feeling of group superiority appears to provide its members with an immense narcissistic 
gratification. People in power can usually count on a warm response of approval and often of 
affection and love from their compatriots whenever they praise or add to the glory of the social 
unit. 
 All these phenomena can be understood, in the last analysis, as pertaining to our finite time-
and-energy budgets, and consequently our limited capacity for problem-solving, and our limited 
capacity to sympathize with, identify with, and be emotionally involved with more than a very 
limited number of conspecifics (Warnock, 1975; Ike, 1987). “Being a limited resource, 
affectivity in man favors interaction units where this resource may be invested in the most 
economical manner: it can be bestowed on a limited number of persons only” (Meyer, 1987). 
Hence the individual’s limited niche in the nexus of cross-cutting human configurations. Human 
affectivity is of major importance in the establishment of social boundaries. Any social system 
requires boundary maintenance and mutual identification of actors (Meyer, 1987; Ike, 1987; 
a.o.). 
 The human sympathy group seems to be limited to about 11 individuals (Buys & Larson, 
1979). These authors suppose that this magnitude possibly has co-antecedents in the human 
social-biological evolution, i.e., in the small hunting bands of our ancestors. So too, Washburn 
& Harding (1975) state: “Man evolved to feel strongly about few people, short distances, and 
relatively brief intervals of time; and these are still the dimensions of life that are psychologi-
cally important to him”. 
 For most of our evolutionary history group identification was essential to the survival and 
well-being of the individual (Wallace, 1864; Darwin, 1871; Alexander, 1974 et seq.; Corning, 
1983; Barash & Lipton, 1985; Dunbar, 1987; Flohr, 1987; Slurink, 1994; Caporael, 1996; a.o.). 
Thus we see that an important element in the psychological make up of human beings is a 
profound inclination to belong, to be part of a group, and the bigger and more powerful the 
group, the better. For our ancestors “security came in large part from the defense of the tribe 
against other tribes” (Barash & Lipton, 1985). Survival depended on the cooperative assistance 
of one’s fellow group members. 
 Alexander (1974 et seq,), Slurink (1994) and Caporael (1996), among others, argued that 
during hominid/human evolution individuals better adapted to group-living (even to the point of 
hypersociality and obligate interdependence) would have been selectively favored. 
At all times we had to rely on support by the group, and also on being accepted by the group. 
For this reason we had to adapt to the group; we had to adopt its modes of behavior and its value 
orientations. High respect for one’s group more or less (psycho)logically implies devaluing out-
groups. A tendency to form prejudices can thus be derived from our striving for group identity 
(Flohr, 1987). 
 Lorenz (1966) hypothesized that the formation of affiliative bonds between members of the 
same group are intensified by aggression directed towards individuals outside of the group: “The 
principle of the bond formed by having something in common which has to be defended against 
outsiders remains the same, from cichlids defending a common territory or brood, right up to 
scientists defending a common opinion and – most dangerous of all – fanatics defending a 
common ideology. In all these cases aggression is necessary to enhance the bond”. 
 Prejudices thrive on polarization, on the maximization of differences between classes. 
Stereotypes and prejudices are, unmoralistically considered, heuristics or cognitive templates 
which work most of the time, and which prevent the stimulus overload of the cognitive system, 
and which provide some degree of self-esteem by creating a simple order out of chaos and 
uncertainty. “We love our prejudices, because they not only provide us with cognitive, but also 
with social stability” (Bergler, 1976). Prejudices acquired at some time are stabilized not only 
by selective perception, but also by the fact that the behavior of those who are discriminated 
against is changed due to our discrimination in a way that further seems to justify our 
stereotypes. 
 Ethnic and racial prejudices are not necessarily based on personal experiences and they do 
not necessarily have to reflect private interests. Instead they can be acquired early in life along 
with other values and attitudes that are normative in their social environment. 
 Van den Berghe (1997) reasoned that, far from being inflexible, irrational, resistant to 
experience, and situationally insensitive, stereotypes are, for most people most of the time, low-
cost statistical guides to action in situations where transient encounters between strangers make 
better information costly, unavailable or risky. They may be not much good, but they are 
generally at least somewhat better than nothing in helping to make predictions about the 
behavior of unknown others. 
 Stereotypes exaggerate the differences between groups (dichotomization) and underestimate 
the differences within them (generalization). They can result from erroneous attribution or from 
simplified judgment. Erroneous attribution can be the consequence not only of social pressures 
but also of endogenous factors. The ease, however, with which even absurd stereotypes are 
being formed all the time point in itself towards an innate tendency to think in stereotypes 
(Flohr, 1987). 
 R. Brown (1985) offered an analysis that puts ethnocentrism together with group 
stereotyping and perceived inequity in resources to explain group conflict. He regards the 
individual’s desire for a positive self-image and in-group preference a basic tendency of 
humanity, and perception of inequity as a factor that moves a group from ethnocentrism to 
aggression and hostility. 
 Vine (1987) suggests the possibility that organized aggressive competition between groups of 
hominids did not appear during hominid evolution until the ‘self-system’ had evolved to an 
appreciable degree – making strong yet fluid collective social loyalties possible. During the 
evolutionary transition to self-awareness, Vine proposes, selection would have favored moderate 
levels of self-bias and self-deception, in preference to strictly realistic self-consciousness, in the 
service of the overarching ‘meta-motive’ of self-esteem. 
 Anne Flohr (1994) lists the following cognitive mechanisms: selective perception and 
perceptual distortions (double standard in judging the same behavior of members of ingroup and 
outgroup), avoidance of dissonant information, ‘boomerang effect’ (Jervis), ‘confirmation bias’ 
(Peterson), ‘availability heuristic’, ‘halo effect’, and ‘evoked sets’. Furthermore, she identifies 
‘fundamental attribution error’, ‘black-white thinking’ (dualities), ‘worst-case thinking’, ‘self-
fulfilling prophecies’, and ‘projection’. 
 
 
Evolutionary Theories of Ethnocentrism 
 
Ethnocentrism is a major explanans in contemporary theories of primitive warfare. The founding 
father of modern sociobiology, E.O. Wilson (1978) regards it as a culturally hypertrophied 
biological predisposition: 
 
 The practice of war is a straightforward example of a hypertrophied biological predis-
position. Primitive men cleaved their universe into friends and enemies and responded with 
quick, deep emotion to even the mildest threats emanating from outside the arbitrary boundary... 
 The force behind most warlike policies is ethnocentrism, the irrationally exaggerated 
allegiance of individuals to their kin and fellow tribesmen. 
 
Also Meyer (1977 et seq.) regards ethnocentrism and xenophobia as cultural hypertrophies. He 
argues that the extreme ethnocentrism of primitive peoples sets preconditions for violent 
interaction, while specific conditions serve as triggers. Meyer suggests that the basic motivation 
in violent encounters between members of distinct groups is not ‘aggression’ impelled by some 
sort of drive, instinct, or appetite, but ‘fear’. Fear generated by the position of the cultural ‘we-
group’ in a threatening universe made up of ‘they-groups’, endangering the social cosmos by 
their very existence. 
 
 
Kin Selection and Inclusive Fitness 
Evolutionary and sociobiological explanations of ethnocentrism and xenophobia are for the most 
part rooted in kin selection, inclusive fitness, and altruism theories. Inclusive fitness, as 
Alexander (1979) explains, is a simple idea. As social organisms we tend to lead our lives 
embedded in networks of near and distant kin. The concept of inclusive fitness simply tells us 
that not merely our offspring but any genetic relative socially available to us is a potential 
avenue of genetic reproduction. Altruism toward relatives is of course not really altruism at all, 
but rather the tendency of individuals to maximize the reproductive success of their genes via 
their relatives, that is, via the other bodies in which copies of these genes reside. 
 Alexander & Borgia (1978) argued that nepotism to nondescendants and distant descendant 
relatives is an extension of (evolutionarily) earlier altruism in the form of parental care. 
Alexander (1979) argued that reciprocity (or ‘selfish cooperation’ as Corning [1983] called it) is 
in turn largely derived from nepotism. Vanhanen (1992) considers tribalism, casteism, national-
ism, etc. as forms of nepotism adapted to large societies). 
 In the small bands in which humans are generally presumed to have lived during most of 
their evolutionary history, virtually all social interactions were among relatives. The same is 
probably true for contemporary hunter-gatherer societies.’Generalized reciprocity’ involves 
mostly one-way flows of benefits because it is largely nepotism (the return is genetic), and 
‘negative reciprocity’ involves one-way flows because it consists of one-time interactions 




This diagram from Sahlins (1965) illustrates the different types of what he called ‘social 
reciprocity’ in primitive cultures. The information in the lower left quadrant has been added by 
Alexander (1975, 1979) to suggest how kin selection and evolutionary principles accord with 
reciprocity, as practised by human groups. The information in the lower right quadrant has been 
added by me. 
 
‘Balanced reciprocity’, on the other hand, tends to occur between distant relatives or 
nonrelatives that are likely to interact repeatedly, and therefore involves balanced flows of 
benefits (see also Masters, 1964; Service, 1966; and Shaw & Wong, 1989). 
 The moral gradient and the vector of violence and dehumanization running through these 
concentric circles was already clearly seen and eloquently formulated by Marett (1933): 
“[T]here stand out in sharp contrast to each other three spheres of conduct, to which entirely 
separate commandments apply as follows: to the first, Thou shalt commit no murder; to the 
second, Thou shalt compound with thy neighbor on the principle that a life for a life is fair give-
and-take; and to the third, Thou shalt utterly destroy the destroyer”. 
 In discussing the absence of war in some Inuit tribes, Irwin (1987) predicted (in contrast to 
Hamilton, 1975) that social behavior can be polarized at all population boundaries where there is 
some variation in the coefficient of relatedness between adjacent demes. In other words, Irwin 
said, rivalry between closely related human populations is as predictable a phenomenon as 
sibling rivalry. If the humans in these populations stopped making war then something must 
have happened to the coefficient of relatedness, or the cost/benefit ratio, or both. 
 
Cultural Badges (Markers) and the Proximate Mechanisms of Kin Recognition 
What features will be chosen as ethnic markers or badges? There are many possibilities, tending 
to fall into three main categories of traits. 
First, one can pick a genetically transmitted phenotype, such as skin pigmentation, stature, hair 
texture, facial features or some such ‘racial’ characteristic. 
Second, one can rely on a man-made ethnic uniform. Members of one group are identified by 
bodily mutilations and/or adornments carried as visible badges of group belonging. These 
markers range from clothing and headgear to body painting, tattooing, circumcision, tooth filing 
and sundry mutilations of the lips, nose and earlobes. 
Third, the test can be behavioral. Ethnicity is determined by speech, demeanour, manners, 
rituals, ceremonies, etiquette, esoteric lore or some other proof of competence in a behavioral 
repertoire characteristic of the group. Language is the supreme test of ethnicity (e.g., the shib-
boleth), because it is almost absolutely ‘fake-proof’. Many, including non-ethnic groups, use 
particular attitudes or idiosyncrasies as litmus tests of group membership. 
 Some criteria seem to have more staying power than others, and the ones with high 
heritability appear to have an edge (Van den Berghe, 1981, 1989, 1992). 
 Shaw & Wong (1989) consider as recognition markers, taking on potent heuristic and 
emotive value in demarcating in-group/out-group boundaries, to include language, religion, 
phenotype, homeland, and myth of common descent. 
 The importance of kin recognition mechanisms as intermediaries of kin selection was 
recognized by Hamilton in his 1964 classic paper. He proposed four possible mechanisms: (1) 
recognition alleles; (2) spatial distribution or location (depending upon a high correlation 
between location and kinship); (3) association or familiarity (due to living and rearing arrange-
ments, individuals with whom one is familiar are more likely to be kin than others); (4) 
phenotypic matching (dependent upon an assumed correlation between genotype and 
phenotype). Phenotypic matching, or self-referent phenotype matching (also known as the 
armpit effect because many animals recognize each other olfactorily – through the smell of their 
sweat) is based on perceived similarities and differences. 
 To deal with the problem of in-group membership recognition, natural selection has 
repeatedly evolved a proximate mechanism known as badging. Badges can be learned and may 
be one of the simplest, most rudimentary forms of culture presently known (e.g., bird song 
dialects). 
 As related individuals possess genes in common, they may produce a cue which is 
genetically determined and thus possessed by all kin. Detection of such a cue (innate badge) is 
possible due to a genetic mechanism in which a genetically coded phenotypic trait is tied to a 
genetically coded basis for recognition of that trait. This is the idea behind recognition alleles. 
 Of the mechanisms of kin identification, Holmes & Sherman (1983) consider the possibility 
of recognition alleles (‘innate feature detectors’ as Rushton [1989] called them) as most 
problematic. However, this ‘green beard effect’, as Dawkins (1976; 1981) calls it, is essentially 
what badging is; the only difference is that humans (and some song birds) do not grow 
differently colored beards to identify kin, they may wear false beards of different colors in the 
form of culture. Human dialects, like bird song dialects, may also function as population 
markers. 
 Thus, as Irwin (1987) suggests, many aspects of culture which vary dramatically from tribe 
to tribe could be understood as learned and culturally transmitted ethnocentric expressions of a 
genetic predisposition to group bonding and badging, rather than as adaptations of tribe to tribe 
differences in immediate ecology. Differences in dialect, dress, art, symbol, ritual, scarification, 
tattoos and/or body paint symptomatic of group membership could fall into this class of culture 
traits. Most cultural differences may be assumed to be of the badging variety. This would be 
especially true when sexual organs are involved, as in various forms of circumcision, which 
become cultural and tribal requirements for acceptable mates. 
 As badging of the kind described here evolved, at least in part, to determine questions of 
mate choice, then it would follow that tribal enculturation of this variety should be completed 
prior to mating. Thus it is no surprise that young adolescents are particularly impressionable and 
prone to the creation and wearing of badges with which to identify their ethnic in-groups (Irwin, 
1987). 
 Association/familiarity is a very likely candidate for kin recognition among humans. But it 
seems probable that phenotypic matching is another and supplementary mechanism (Alexander, 
1979; Essock-Vitale & McGuire, 1980; Michod, 1982). 
 From a sociobiological perspective, as Tönnesmann (1987) points out, one should not expect 
a human being to be willing to cooperate indiscriminately with any other conspecific, but to 
apply criteria such as similarity in physical appearance in order to assess the possibility of a 
genetic relationship. Thus one could say with Barkow (1980) that the theory of ethnocentrism is 
“the converse of altruism”, and “that we should most readily learn distrust and hostility towards 
those who least resemble us, and towards those with whom we have no personal relationship, 
that is, strangers” (Barkow, 1980; cf. Rushton, 1980). In fact, similarity seems to be related to 
empathic responses, and, more generally, liking between individuals is increased when they 
perceive each other as similar (e.g., Turner, 1982). 
 Rushton (1986, 1988) and Rushton, Russell & Wells (1984) developed ‘genetic similarity 
theory’: “If a gene can better ensure its own survival by acting so as to bring about the 
reproduction of family members with whom it shares copies, then it can also do so by bringing 
about the reproduction of any organism in which copies can be found... It can be expected that 
two individuals within an ethnic group will, on average, be more similar to each other 
genetically than two individuals from different ethnic groups” (Rushton, 1986; see also Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, 1989). Kenrick (1989), on the other hand, argued that “people are not so much 
attracted to similar others, as they are repulsed by those who are not similar”. The consequence, 
however, a biologically based disposition toward ethnocentrism, would be the same (A. Flohr, 
1994). 
 Although similarity in physical appearance may serve as an indicator of consanguinity in the 
absence of genealogical knowledge, as Barkow (1980) suggests, such knowledge could be 
fabricated, at least in superficial terms, by making people believe that they have descended from 
common ancestors. Ethnic markers, such as skin color, clothing, or behavioral peculiarities, 
could be used for the purpose of making an ethnic group appear to be a group of genetically 
related individuals. Altruistic acts on behalf of non-kin can be elicited by taking advantage of 
the cues produced by evolution for kin recognition. According to G.R. Johnson (1986), 
patriotism in contemporary large-scale societies is a brand of manipulated altruism. Large-scale 
human societies have evolved processes of socialization which exploit the cues by which 
altruism originally came to be elicited in the course of several million years of hominid 
evolution. 
 
Kin Selection, Nepotism and the Genetic Seeds of Warfare 
In The Ethnic Phenomenon, Van den Berghe (1981) formulated the first theory of ethnocentrism 
as extended kin selection. Van den Berghe’s basic argument is quite simple: ethnic sentiments 
are extensions of kinship sentiments. Ethnocentrism is thus an extended form of nepotism – the 
propensity to favor kin over nonkin. There exists a general behavioral predisposition, in our 
species as in many others, to react favorably toward other organisms to the extent these 
organisms are biologically related to the actor. The closer the relationship is, the stronger the 
preferential behavior. Genes that predispose their carrying organisms to behave nepotistically 
will be selected for, because, by favoring nepotism, they enhance their own replication. This 
genetically selected propensity for nepotism is also called kin selection. 
 The degree of cooperation between organisms can be expected to be a direct function of the 
proportion of the genes they share. Conversely, the degree of conflict between them is an 
inverse function of the proportion of shared genes. 
 Ethnicity is a matter of degree of relatedness. People typically form both alliances and 
cleavages, and grade the violence and destructiveness they inflict on each other on the basis of 
their real or perceived degree of relatedness. That is, both cooperation (nepotism and 
reciprocity) and conflict (coercion and exploitation; negative reciprocity) in and between human 
societies follow a calculus of inclusive fitness. 
 An ethnic group (or ethny) can be represented as a cluster of overlapping, ego-centered, 
concentric kin circles, encompassed within an ethnic boundary. The ethnic boundary is seldom 
completely closed. More typically, there is some migration, principally of women, among 
groups. 
 Ethnicity is defined, in the last analysis, by common descent. Ethnic boundaries are created 
socially by preferential endogamy and physically by territoriality. The prototypical ethny is thus 
a descent group bounded socially by inbreeding and spatially by territory. 
 We have evolved, Van den Berghe argues, the kind of brain to deal with small-scale, 
Gemeinschaft-type groups, the prototype of which is the ethny, the ‘we-group’, the ‘in-group’ of 
intimates who think of each other as an extended family. Ethnicity can be manipulated but not 
manufactured. Unless ethnicity is rooted in generations of shared historical experience, it cannot 
be created ex nihilo. 
 There is a profound asymmetry in the reproductive strategies for males and females, and, 
therefore, the ultimate scarce resource for competing males in the fitness game is reproductive 
females. Thus, the capture, defense and seduction of women often plays as salient a role in 
intergroup and interethnic relations, as it does between the individual members of the same 
ethny. The classical scenario for conquest is to rape the women and kill, castrate or enslave the 
men. 
 Subsequently, Van den Berghe (1997) argued that in contrast to ethnocentrism, which is 
universal as it is rooted in the biology of nepotism, racism, rooted in social categories, is 
exceptional and relatively ephemeral because it tends ‘naturally’ to decay; interbreeding blurs 
racial boundaries. 
 Furthermore, he argues, ethnocentrism does not automatically and invariably imply xeno-
phobia. Being for one’s own group does not, of necessity, imply being against all other groups. 
Unqualified exclusion of vast categories of potential partners in reciprocal exchanges is not the 
best strategy. 
 
Shaw & Wong (1987, 1989) present an elaborate theory of kin selection, ethnocentrism, and the 
evolution of human warfare. They propose that inclusive fitness considerations have combined 
with competition over scarce resources, intergroup conflict, and weapon development, to 
(1) reinforce humanity’s propensity to band together in groups of genetically related individuals; 
(2) predispose group members to act in concert for their own well-being; and 
(3) promote xenophobia, fear, and antagonism among genetically related individuals towards 
strangers. 
 Shaw & Wong interpret these responses as ‘emerging’ or reinforcing proximate causes which 
shaped the structure of social behavior in hunter/gatherer groups for 99 percent of humanity’s 
existence. Their model rests on three premises: that individuals have evolved not only to be 
egoistic, but to be nepotistically altruistic; that individuals in nucleus ethnic groups, are 
predisposed to mobilize for resource competition in ways that will enhance inclusive fitness and 
reproductive potential; and that intergroup conflict/warfare has been positively functional in 
humanity’s evolution. 
Kin selection implies that sexual organisms, such as humans, have evolved not only to be 
egoistic but to be fundamentally nepotistically altruistic. Kin selection also provides an ultimate, 
evolutionary rationale for anticipating origins of ‘self-sacrifice to the death’. As individuals are 
motivated to maximize their inclusive fitness rather than personal survival and reproduction 
alone, sacrifice to the death can still have a genetic payoff; it can enhance reproduction and 
survival of close relatives who share the same genes by common descent. That is, an 
individual’s genes – the units of natural selection – can still be propagated even though personal 
fitness is lost in the process. As shocking and destabilizing as the death of a group member may 
be, inclusive fitness considerations provide a rational basis for accepting costs of death in 
warfare. 
 Inclusive fitness has also been demonstrated to be an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). 
This means that it would not likely be easily displaced by competing ‘behavioral strategies’ (that 
is, pure selfishness or unrestrained altruism) because of its superiority in maximizing 
reproduction and survival throughout evolution. 
 The considerations raised above interact to make mobilization for conflict or warfare a more 
viable, cohesive strategy if pursued among related kin. From an evolutionary perspective, these 
considerations are the bedrock upon which Shaw & Wong link ethnic mobilization and the seeds 
of warfare. 
 Since failure to maintain a balance of power could have resulted in extinction, groups and 
their expansion figure as forces of selection in Shaw & Wong’s theory. Motivated by resource 
competition, conflict, and warfare, struggles to maintain balances of power gave rise to more 
complex societal units (e.g., chiefdoms, states) which continued the legacy of intergroup 
warfare. Groups as forces of selection must have reinforced suspicion and intolerance of out-
group members as well as war proneness during a long period of humanity’s past. 
 If resources are defendable, and if conflict is inevitable, as McEachron & Baer (1982) have 
explained, it makes better evolutionary sense for groups to compete to resolve ownership of the 
resources as groups rather than being submitted to both the internal conflict and decreased 
inclusive fitness that would accompany a merger. 
 As Hamilton (1975) observed, to raise mean fitness in hunter-gatherer groups either new 
territory or outside mates had somehow to be obtained. Capture of out-group females through 
successful warfare, Shaw & Wong continue, serves three functions: (1) it reduces inbreeding 
depression by increasing the number of available partners for reproduction; (2) it increases 
variation in the warring group’s genetic stock; and (3) it contributes to group size. The latter 
consideration would have been especially important in environments where groups were 
effective forces of selection. The practice of taking females for loot would undoubtedly have set 
rival groups on edge and reinforced xenophobia and out-group enmity in the process. 
 In the evolutionary long run, larger groups would have displaced smaller groups and their 
members would thus have staked out a larger share of humanity’s gene pool. This implies that 
behavioral predispositions that facilitated group expansion would have been retained and 
incorporated into the more permanent repertoire of individual and group behavior (see also 
Bigelow, 1969, 1972). 
A perspective very similar to Van den Berghe’s and Shaw & Wong’s theories has been 
presented by Vanhanen (1991, 1992) and A. Flohr (1994). 
 
Criticism 
So far a brief outline of Shaw & Wong’s theory of kin selection, ethnocentrism and the seeds of 
warfare. 
 “Inclusive fitness may account for xenophobia and kin group warfare”, Somit (1990) 
commented, “but I find it unpersuasive when stretched to explain nationalism, patriotism, and 
contemporary warfare. I doubt, for example, that very many of the millions of soldiers who died 
during the last two great wars were motivated to any significant degree by the desire, conscious 
or unconscious, to maximize their inclusive fitness”. Furthermore, one gets the impression that 
the authors view war as a spontaneous manifestation of mass sentiment. Little weight is given to 
the personal ambitions and animosities of those in high office, political rivalries, dynastic 
aspirations, or the capacity of the regime to compel, as well as persuade, military service. Not 
the many but the few make the ultimate decision to take up arms (Somit, 1990). 
 What seems to be the most serious problem in the evolutionary ethnocentrism theory as 
exposed by Shaw & Wong is that as soon as group competition for resources and the balance-of-
power concept is introduced, the foregoing considerations of kin selection, nepotism, 
xenophobia and ethnocentrism seem to dwindle into insignificance as their role as explanatory 
categories vanishes. The most scathing criticism of (evolutionary) ethnocentrism theory has 
been formulated by Ferguson & Whitehead (1992; cf. McCauley, 1990): “Stereotypes of 
savages notwithstanding, it would be an extremely rare occurrence for members of one tribe to 
attack members of another simply because they are different, apart from any other source of 
conflict... Any idea that an innate sense of tribalism inclines people toward collective violence is 
sheer fantasy”. In other words, ethnic conflicts do not occur in an economic or political vacuum; 
but at the same time the salience of the political and economic dimensions of the conflict make 
it increasingly invisible as an ‘ethnic’ conflict. 
 
This paper is based on the chapter “Of badges, bonds and boundaries: ethnocentrism, 
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